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Never before did a Dutch election attract as much attention from foreign 
media as the one on 15 March 2017. Journalists swarmed to the Netherlands, 
driven by one big question: Will Geert Wilders win? Wilders became a topic 
of particular interest thanks to the dramatic votes of 2016: the Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as 
President of the United States. The prospect thus lured that the Netherlands 
would see a similar dramatic turn-around, one that would be indicative of a 
transnational ‘rise of populism’. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte qualified – 
and dismissed – such expectations as a ‘domino theory’ which suggests that 
with one or two countries falling prey to populist movements, the rest will 
follow automatically (Jonker 2017). 
Eventually, Wilders was not the big victor of 15 March. He got 13.3 
percent of the vote-share, corresponding to 20 of the 150 seats in the Dutch 
Lower House, which is five seats more than he got at the previous elections 
in 2012 but four less than his best result to date in 2010. What is more, the 
Freedom Party certainly did not become the biggest party, and it was 
effectively side-lined from the government to be formed. Ironically, soon, 
commentators started to float a reverse domino theory, in which the relative 
loss of Wilders was prefigured by the win of Alexander Van der Bellen of the 
presidential elections in Austria and followed in May 2017 by the victory of 
Emanuel Macron over Marine Le Pen in the French presidential elections. 
However, if anything, the experience of the Dutch elections signals the 
normalization of anti-pluralist populism, even if they do not come out 
victorious. While for a long time, anti-pluralist populist parties could still be 
treated as an aberration and a rather marginal phenomenon, recent elections 
indicate that they are there to stay as a significant political force in many 
political systems. Considerable attention has been devoted to those EU 
member states, Hungary and Poland, in which we witness actual backsliding 
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in terms of political pluralism and the rule of law (Bánkuti/Halmai/ 
Scheppele, 2012; Müller 2015a; Closa/Kochenov 2016; Schipplak/Treib 
2017). However, the normalization of anti-pluralist populism and the 
potential threat it poses to democratic pluralism in Europe is a phenomenon 
that applies to a much wider range of European countries, including for 
instance France, Germany, Austria, Finland, and Denmark. 
In this paper, I use the Dutch case to discuss this development and its 
broader implications for Europe at large. After characterising anti-pluralist 
populism, I turn to the Dutch 2017 elections and analyse their outcome as 
well as their historical context. While the Dutch case obviously has some 
particular features of its own, there are clear parallels with anti-pluralist 
movements in other European countries and it certainly raises fundamental 
question for Europe as a whole. 
 
2. What is anti-pluralist populism? 
 
Too often the term populism remains rather intuitive and fuzzy. It is used in a 
pejorative way to refer to political movements that are considered as 
distorting the way ‘democratic politics as we know it’ works. Calling 
politicians ‘populists’ is often a way to disqualify them. Hence it is important 
to be precise. For that, I propose to depart from two basic understandings of 
populism. 
In the first way, it is only natural for politicians to be populists: they 
should listen to the people at large and appeal to them. That is exactly what 
we expect politicians to do in a democracy. In this sense, all politicians 
should be populists; the only respect in which they are likely to vary is that 
some have less ideological spine and thus cater more openly for the popular 
vote compared to politicians who more insist on particular ideological 
principles. This is probably what the Dutch prime minister Mark Rutter 
(Jonker 2017) referred to on election night when he distinguished “the wrong 
kind of populism” from, what is supposedly, the “the right kind”. 
However, when we today talk about populist politicians, we are often not 
just referring to opportunist politicians but to something more specific. 
Importantly, populism is not inherently related to a particular ideological 
view. In general, we recognize that there can be both left-wing and right-
wing populists. Drawing on the work of Margarat Canovan (1999) and Jan-
Werner Müller (2015b; 2016), we can say that populism is rather about a 
certain style of politics and the underlying understanding of the nature of 
democratic politics in pluralist societies. Populists distinguish themselves 
because they rely on a moral notion of a homogenous and pure people that is 
united by a single common identity and interest, and it is them – the populist 
politicians – who represent, articulate or even embody, this single united 
interest. 
By implication, populists challenge a pluralist understanding of modern 
societies in which it is natural that multiple competing interests and identities 
co-exist. Instead, you are either with or against the people. As Jan-Werner 
Müller (2015b: 86) puts it: “populists consistently and continuously deny the 
very legitimacy of their opponents (as opposed to just saying that some of 
their policies are misguided)”. What is more, and indeed fundamental, is that 
Müller adds that in their denial of the legitimacy of political alternatives, 
populists are ultimately “willing to risk a crisis of liberal democracy [i.e. the 
basic political structure/constitution] itself”. 
Thus, to complete the argument, why do we care so much about the rise 
of populism in the UK, the US and the Netherlands? It is basically because of 
the threat that if they would take effective control, liberal democracy itself 
may be at risk. 
The anti-pluralism that characterizes populism in this interpretation also 
logically positions it against European integration or indeed any 
internationalist political engagement, as their inter-national character 
inherently brandishes these arrangements as pluralist. Populists perceive such 
international pluralism as an encroachment on the ‘pure’ national identity 
they claim to represent, and hence are bound to oppose international political 
arrangements. Thus, it is no coincidence that all national political parties that 
we can characterize anti-pluralist populists tend to oppose European 
integration and to advocate the departure of the county from it. 
Now, as said, the anti-pluralist populists have not taken control in the 
Netherlands. Importantly, however, they have not gone away either and it 
does not look like they will. Instead, they seem to become a permanent force 
in the Dutch parliament with a vote share of, depending on how you count, 
between 20 per cent to up to one third of the parliament. What is more, the 
presence and continuous political competition of the sizable minority is felt 
throughout the party landscape. Many mainstream parties have felt the need 
to pick up on the kind of issues – like migration, nationalism, Euroscepticism 
– that these parties highlight and to adjust their positions in their direction. It 
are these circumstances that reflect what I characterize as “the normalisation 
of populism”. 
 
3. The 2017 Dutch elections 
 
Even if the Freedom Party had to leave the position of the biggest party in the 
Dutch Lower House to the Liberal-Conservatives of the VVD, the outcome 
of the 2017 Dutch elections was quite spectacular in several respects. 38 of 
the 150 seats in parliament (i.e. more than 25%) changed party. Notably, 29 




the Labour Party (PvdA), which after having served a difficult 4-year terms 
as junior partner in the government, saw its seat share crumble from 38 to a 
mere 9 seats. Notably, the other major loser was its senior partner, Mark 
Rutte’s VVD, which lost 8 seats but nevertheless remained the biggest party 
with 33 seats in parliament – indeed, the smallest biggest party the 
Netherlands has ever seen 
As said, Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party was among the winners and ended 
second with 20 seats coming from 15. The Christian-Democrats even won 
one seat more, which got them to 19 seats, the same number that the 
progressive liberals of D66 secured coming from 12 seats in 2012. The 
biggest gains were however secured by the Greens of GroenLinks who 
revenged their pitiful 4 seats result in 2012 by moving up to a, for them, 
unprecedented number of 14 seats, the same number as their more left-wing 
brethren from the Socialist Party who got to 14 seats by losing one. While the 
Christian-conservative parties, Christian-Union and the Calvinists of the SGP 
remained stable at 5 and, respectively, 3 seats, there was more turmoil among 
the other smaller parties. Notably, the Party for the Animals and the Party for 
the Pensioners (50+) both went up from the two seats they held previously, 
the Animal Party to 5 and 50+ to 4 seats. Finally, two parties succeeded in 
entering parliament for the first time: the migrants-oriented party DenK with 
three seats and the conservative anti-establishment and anti-Europe party, 
Forum for Democracy with two. 
With this outcome, the formation of the new Dutch government was 
bound to take considerable time. By all indications, the core of the 
government coalition would need to be formed by the VVD, the CDA and 
D66. Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party has been ruled out as a credible coalition 
partners by all parties, including Wilders’ former party, the VVD. In turn, its 
major losses also ruled the PvdA out as a credible partner. 
Still, the combination VVD-CDA-D66 falls 5 seats short of the absolute 
majority of 76 seats that is usually needed for a stable government in the 
Netherlands. Hence, a fourth partner was needed. While attempts to involve 
GroenLinks, as the major election winner, into the coalition failed, 
negotiations turned to the Christian-Union. Negotiations lasted over the 
summer of 2017, but on 26 October a new majority government was 
inaugurated with the support of the four parties: VVD, CDA, D66 and the 
Christian-Union. 
 
Table 1: After election seat share of parties in Dutch Lower House  
Parties 2010 2012 2017 
VVD (Conservative Liberals) 31 41 33 
PvdA (Labour Party) 30 38 9 
CDA (Christian-Democrats) 21 13 19 
PVV (Freedom Party) 24 15 20 
D66 (Progressive Liberals) 10 12 19 
SP (Socialist Party) 15 15 14 
GroenLinks (Greens) 10 4 14 
ChristenUnie (Christian-Union) 5 5 5 
SGP (Calvinist Party) 2 3 3 
PvdD (Party for the Animals) 2 2 5 
50PLUS (pensioners party)  2 4 
DenK (Diversity Movement)   3 
Forum voor Democratie (Forum for Democracy)   2 
Total seats 150 150 150 
Number of parties 10 11 13 
 
4. The evolving structure of Dutch politics 
 
If we position the 2017 elections in the Netherlands in its broader historical 
context, it underlines the overarching trend of the demise of the big parties. 
This is a trend that of course has its parallels elsewhere; the absence of the 
classical big parties in the latest presidential run-off in France is a major 
example. Still, the trend in Dutch politics is particularly pronounced and 
steady. If we look at the three big parties that have been central to Dutch 
politics – CDA, PvdA and VVD – we see that they would take well over 80% 
or even over 90% of the parliamentary seats in the 1950s. Since then their 
share has gone down, even if one or the other of them would sometimes 
bounce back at the cost of the others. Actually, until the mid-1970s there 
were three mainstream Christian-Democratic parties, with the Catholic KVP 
the most prominent one. As they saw their vote share decline, they merged 
into the CDA. 
The party landscape that emerged from the mid-1970s onwards basically 
had the newly merged CDA in a pivotal positon in the middle. Depending on 
the election outcome, it would either form a coalition on its left-hand side 









This straightforward left-right logic was however brutally disturbed when in 
1994 the CDA had a disastrous election result dropping from 54 seats to 34. 
For the first time since 1917 no Christian parties were involved in the 
government coalition. Instead, Prime Minister Wim Kok formed a so-called 
“purple” coalition that joined his Labour Party with the liberal conservative 
VVD and the progressive liberals of D66. 
While the purple coalition thus broke the hegemony of the Christian-
Democrats, it also indicated that the ideological differences between the main 
Dutch parties had become very small, leaving little to choose for the average 
voter. 
It is on this sense of a lack of electoral choice and a sense of closed-up 
elite politics that Pim Fortuijn successfully mobilized in the 2002 election 
campaign. As is well-known, Pim Fortuijn was shot by an animal activist in 
the week before the 2002 elections. But it is on the same kind of sentiments 
that Geert Wilders has been campaigning ever since he left the VVD-party in 
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(especially Muslim migrants) and against internationalism (especially 
European integration). 
While the governing parties thus demonstrated that all combinations were 
possible and thus that all party differences were surmountable, voters – like 
in most Western countries – became ever less loyal to them. In the 
Netherlands, such loss of loyalty becomes easily visible as there is no 
threshold for new parties to enter the parliament and there is hence a 
considerable number of parties competing for the vote. Figure 2 demonstrates 
how voter volatility has shot up ever since the mid-1990s, with the 2017 
elections coming second with 38 of the 150 seats transferred after 2002 when 
this was 46. 
 
Figure 2: Seat transfers between parties per elections 
 
 
Presumably the increase of voter volatility also reflects a trend of ideological 
preferences becoming more diverse and less coherent (cf. Blumenstiel 2014). 
Voters vary on ever more dimensions. Ideological preferences in terms of left 
and right have become detached from preferences on ethical issues, on 
international cooperation, on the environment and on migration. In other 
words, we find a greater number of ideological combinations and, hence, 
voters inevitably have to compromise on some issues once they cast their 
















5. Populism and identity politics in the 2017 election 
campaign 
 
The fragmentation of the ideological space in Dutch politics was also clearly 
apparent in the terms on which parties waged the election campaign towards 
the 2017 elections. While socio-economic (left-right) differences certainly 
played a role, parties invoked a wide range of themes to distinguish 
themselves from the others. Notably, for instance the Socialist Party put the 
issue of health care in the spotlight and campaigned for rolling back the 
previous privatization policies in the sector. Similarly, the Greens highlighted 
climate change-related issues. 
Nevertheless, the key issue that overshadowed all others in the 2017 
election campaign was the issue of Dutch identity, what it involves and how 
to demarcate good Dutch citizens from the others. Obviously, this is an issue 
that reflects above all Geert Wilders’ agenda, in which the Dutch identity is 
systematically opposed to the others of Muslim immigrants and European 
integration. Wilders’ prominence on the Dutch political scene and his high 
standing in the polls forced most of the other parties to clearly position 
themselves on the identity issue as well. Most notably, Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte decided early in the campaign to put out an advertisement in the main 
Dutch newspapers with a letter to all Dutchmen. Key message of this letter 
was a call to behave “normally”. Notably, this call was not directed against 
any one misbehaving, but particularly pointed the finger at migrants. Thus, 
Rutte wrote: “We feel a growing unease when people abuse our freedom to 
mess things up around here, while they have actually come to our country 
because of that freedom. People who do not want to adjust, and who reject 
our habits and values. […] Behave normally or go away” (Rutte 2017). 
Clearly, with this message, Rutte sought to appeal directly to voters who 
potentially would be attracted by Wilders’ rhetoric. 
But Rutte was not alone in adopting the identity issue. Christian-
Democrat leader Sybrand Buma also adopted a harsh tone on migration and 
went public arguing that Dutch school children should learn the national 
anthem and sing it while standing. In turn, newly elected Labour leader 
Lodewijk Asscher gave his own spin to the identity focus by claiming his 
own kind of “progressive patriotism”. Thus, Wilders was extremely 
successful in ensuring that identity politics, and the question who belongs to 
the right Dutch people and who does not, became centre stage in the 
campaign. 
The identity focus of the campaign was reinforced when in the week 
before the elections the Turkish government decided to send Turkish 
ministers to the Netherlands to hold campaign meetings for the upcoming 
constitutional referendum in Turkey. While there have been some candidates 
of Dutch parties who have made a particular effort to get the vote of Dutch 
expats, the public campaigning of Turkish AK politicians on Dutch soil came 
as direct provocation in the midst of the Dutch election campaign. The 
government and Prime Minister Rutte in particular were clear that this could 
not be tolerated and when the Turkish ministers did not withdraw voluntarily, 
they were eventually physically prevented from meeting in the Netherlands. 
In the light of the general evolution of Dutch politics, it is important to 
observe that the identity issue is not just another issue but that it has the 
potential to become deeply divisive. The reason for this is that the emphasis 
on particular identities undermines the recognition that modern democratic 
societies are inherently plural and that politics under those conditions is 
exactly about creating conditions under which people with competing 
interests and competing values can live peacefully together nevertheless. In 
that sense, the identity issue fits perfectly the populist agenda, but it risks 
undermining the essential ability of political parties to reach out across deep 
societal differences. 
In one of the first academic reflections of the Dutch 2017 elections, 
Catherine de Vries (2017) demonstrates that identity-related concerns about 
European integration, migration and national control in international affairs 
have indeed come to play a prominent role in Dutch voter decisions. Notably, 
however, De Vries adds that these new concerns “should not necessarily be 
understood as a cultural backlash, but rather seem a reflection of increased 
economic insecurity”. The people who are more likely to adopt, what de 
Vries calls, ‘parochial’ positions tend to be those with lower levels of 
education and with structural concerns about making ends meet. While these 
findings underline that cultural and economic concerns are often difficult to 
unravel in empirically, I would even add disillusionment with the established 




In the end, the Dutch elections of 15 March 2017 underline that Dutch 
politics tends to become ever more fragmented, with the traditional big 
parties becoming medium-sized, and the need for no less than four parties to 
form any majority coalition. This tendency is reinforced by the way in which 
Wilders has led many of the mainstream parties to define themselves in 
identity terms, and to disassociate themselves from specific groups in Dutch 
society. One implication of this combination of political fragmentation and 
the prominence of identity politics is that building a stable government 
coalition becomes an ever-greater challenge. This is certainly underlined by 
the rather drawn out process of government formation that followed after the 
2017 elections in the Netherlands. 




politics, which is of broader significance for European politics at large, is that 
even if anti-pluralist populist parties do not prevail, this does not mean they 
go away. On the contrary, anti-pluralist voices remain prominent in Dutch 
politics and are essentially waiting in the wings for the established parties to 
fail. This concerns of course above all Geert Wilders’ PVV whose ideal 
prospect towards the next election might well be a broad-based coalition that 
leaves him as the main voice of the opposition. However, Wilders is not 
alone. The Forum voor Democratie is now the second party in parliament that 
consistently exploits the disillusionment with democratic politics as we know 
it. 
Even if the case of the Netherlands is rather typical and distinct, it thus 
also raises fundamental questions about the place of anti-pluralist populism 
across the European continent. The first question is how European 
democracies can live with the continued presence of anti-pluralist populism 
in its midst. Although the support for anti-pluralist populists varies from 
country to country, this is also an urgent question in France, Germany, 
Austria, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. Here it is an open question 
whether populist parties can effectively be socialized into the pluralistic 
democratic process or whether once they are handed the power they are 
destined to undermine political pluralism. The only viable strategy here 
seems an empirical one that continuously monitors these parties on their 
words and actions: those parties that stand strong for pluralist democracy 
cannot leave unexposed any move to undermine the essentials of pluralist 
democracy: basic rights for all, a free and open press, the inviolability of the 
constitution and the rule of law, and no use of physical intimidation. Anti-
pluralist parties often enough play by the game, and at times they may even 
be accommodated within pluralist institutions. However, their continuous 
presence should not make it possible for them to move the boundaries on the 
democratic essentials over time. 
Continuous vigilance is no guarantee that anti-pluralist parties will not, 
sometimes, in some countries, get the upper hand, as they already have in 
Hungary and Poland. That raises the fundamental question what other 
European states can and should do when this happens (cf. Closa and 
Kochenov 2016). We cannot claim the right to interfere directly in domestic 
democratic process. However, it is hard to escape the impression that 
individual EU states as well as the EU as a whole has so far been rather 
unsuccessful in responding to the developments in Hungary and Poland. In 
any case, if countries are sliding into anti-pluralism, any turn-around 
eventually will have to come from within these countries themselves. Hence, 
an approach that focusses on compliance and insistence on the normative 
correctness of the European majority is likely to be unproductive. Instead, 
European responses are best guided by the question what kind of response is 
likely to be most helpful for pluralist movements in the countries concerned 
and to facilitate their return to ascendancy. 
In any case, events over the last few years have removed any illusions that 
the future of Europe will be decided in Brussels. Instead the fate of Europe 
will be decided in the member states. That is why national elections, and 
referendums, are of key importance. Europe cannot save individual states – 
that is something that they can only do themselves. Still, the Europe that is 
built on societal pluralism and international diversity should not become 
hostage to the courses adopted by individual member states. Hence, rather 
than responding to anti-pluralist movements in this or the other country, 
governments committed to pluralism and diversity are well-advised to form a 
European core that gathers around a positive agenda in which the basic 
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